Personnel Economics - William Neilson - 9780131488564 - Economics - Principles of Economics - Pearson Education Schweiz AG - Der Fachverlag fuer Bildungsmedien - 978-0-1314-8856-4
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Personnel Economics

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Titel:   Personnel Economics
Reihe:   Prentice Hall
Autor:   William S. Neilson
Verlag:   Prentice Hall
Einband:   Softcover
Auflage:   1
Sprache:   Englisch
Seiten:   288
Erschienen:   März 2006
ISBN13:   9780131488564
ISBN10:   0-13-148856-2
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Personnel Economics

Description

Neilson is the first Personnel Economics text written specifically for economics majors, and is the only undergraduate text on information economics.

 

Students love this course because it is so applied-everyone is involved in an employment relationship at one time or another, and the students learn what strategies employers use as well as how employees should respond to them.  Professors love it because they get to teach what Micro economists actually do: principal-agent problems, signaling problems, repeated games, bargaining, and much more.


Features

Neilson is the first Personnel Economics text written specifically for economics majors, and is the only undergraduate text on information economics.

 

Students love this course because it is so applied-everyone is involved in an employment relationship at one time or another, and the students learn what strategies employers use as well as how employees should respond to them.  Professors love it because they get to teach what Micro economists actually do: principal-agent problems, signaling problems, repeated games, bargaining, and much more.

 

Do you wish you had a book for Personnel Economics aimed specifically at Economics majors?

·         Neilson is the first Personnel Economics text written specifically for economics majors.  The text begins with a chapter reviewing optimization without calculus (Chapter 2).  This will be a review chapter for every student who has ever taken an economics course.

 

 

Would you like to teach information economics via personnel economics?

 

·         Because Neilson is the first Personnel Economics text written specifically for economics majors, and is the only undergraduate text on information economics this text will not only appeal to the small subset of Labor Economists in the Economics department, but to Mico Theorists, as well.  See chapters 5, 8, and 9 in the Table of Contents.

How do you like or would you like to organize a course of this type?

 

·         Organization: The book is loosely organized around the two major topics of paying and hiring employees.  The compensation section can be subdivided into a section on piece rate pay and a section on other, more strategic methods of compensation.  The hiring section can be subdivided into one on adverse selection, one on finding a job and negotiating a contract, and one on other, less information-based topics.  The text contains two tools chapters, one on optimization, but without calculus, and one on game theory.  Show this with the TOC.

 

How do you cover performance pay with your current text?

 

·         Deep coverage of Performance Pay in Chapters 4-7.  The existing competitor in this market does not get this deep, and this weakness makes Neilson the better book for Economics Departments.

 

Would you like to cover game theory, finitely-repeated games, have analytic coverage of tournaments?

·         See Chapters 8-10.  This coverage is superior to the existing competitor, again, because it is aimed at Economics majors rather than business majors.  It allows the micro theorist to discuss applied topics with the class.

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Table of Contents

Preface

1.       Introduction

                  The Economics of the Employment Relationship

                  The Economics of Incentives and Information

2.       Optimization

                  “How Much” Decisions and Marginal Analysis

                  Global Optimization

                  General Lessons

                  A Classic Example:  The Short-Run Competitive Firm

3.      Traditional Labor Market Analysis

                  The Firm's Problem

                  The Worker's Problem

                  Labor Markets

                  Labor Market Analysis and Personnel Economics

4.       Compensation and Motivation

                  Worker Effort and Efficiency

                  Compensation Schemes and Effort Choices

Piece rates.  Straight salary.  Box:  Do workers on salary work less than those who are paid for performance?  Quotas.  Commission.  Box:  Do workers really work harder when commission rates go up?

                  General Lessons

5.      Piece Rates

                  Piece Rates at Safelite Glass

                  Optimal Piece Rates

                  General Lessons

                  A Closer Look at the Salary Component

                  Optimal Sales Commissions

                  Motivating the Wrong Behavior

6.       Problems with Piece Rates

                  Should Teachers be Paid for Performance?

                           Box:  Do incentives lead to “teaching to the test?”

                  Multiple Tasks

                  Imperfectly-Observed Effort

                  General Lessons

                           The Equal Compensation Principle.  The Incentive Intensity Principle.

7.      Motivating Multiple Types

                  The Full-Information Case

                  Moral Hazard

                  The Optimal Contract for the Hidden-Information Setting

                  General Lessons

8.      Game Theory

                  What is a Game?

                  The Concept of Equilibrium

                  Simultaneous Games

                           Application:  Assigning duties in a team.  Lessons about simultaneous games.

                  Simultaneous Games with Infinitely Many Possible Strategies

                           Application:  Output in a duopoly.

                  Sequential Games

                           Lessons about sequential games.

9.      Tournaments

                  Some Examples

                  A Model of a Tournament

                  Optimal Effort for an Individual Worker

                  Competition Between Workers

                           Box:  Do larger prizes really induce more effort?  A numerical example.

                  Implications for Motivating Workers

Pay for performance?  Pay structures in hierarchies.  Box:  The prize structure in golf tournaments.  The Peter Principle.  Promotions from within vs. hiring from outside.

                  Tournaments when One Worker has an Advantage

Ability differences.  Favoritism.

                  Influence Activities

                           Sucking up.  Backstabbing.  Misrepresenting Information.

10.    Efficiency Wages

                  A Model of Efficiency Wages

                           Repetition.  Harsh punishment.  Repetition and harsh punishment together.

                  General Lessons

                  Restrictions on the Firm's Behavior

Restrictions on wage reductions.  Restrictions on firing.  Unemployment insurance.

11.    Team Incentives

                  Why Teams?

Complementarities.  Identification of contributions.  Knowledge transfer.  Fairness.

                  Three Approaches to Analyzing Teams

A game-theoretic approach.  A public goods approach.  A mathematical approach.  Box:  Splitting the bill in a restaurant.  General lessons.

                  When Can Team Compensation Work?

                  Profit-Sharing and Gain-Sharing

12.     Comparison of Incentive Schemes

                  Getting Workers to Work

                  When Can the Different Schemes be Used?

                  Who Gets the Surplus?

                  A Comparison of Problems

                  Choosing the Right Incentive Scheme

Technical support operators.  College football coaching staffs.  Dental hygienists.

13.    Executive Compensation

                  A Few Examples

                  Aligning the CEO's and the Owners' Interests

                  Stock vs. Stock Options

                  Insulating CEOs from Broad Market Swings

                           Box:  Do CEOs benefit from laying off workers?

                  Why are CEOs Paid So Much?

14.    Performance Evaluation

                  A Tale of Two Firms

                  The Supervisor's Problem

                           Box:  How many rating categories should there be?

                  The Worker's Problem

                  Forced Rating Distributions

                  General Lessons

15.    Adverse Selection

                  Trying to Hire the Best Workers

                           Box:  Adverse selection an hiring airport security screeners.

                  When Does Adverse Selection Occur?

                           Box:  Can baseball teams identify high-productivity players?

                  Solving the Adverse Selection Problem

                           Piece rates.  Probationary contracts.

                  Adverse Selection in Other Areas of Economics

                           Used cars.  Car repairs.  Health insurance.

16.    Signaling

                  Getting an Education

Discounting the future.  General lessons about getting an education.  Some real world numbers.

                  Education as a Signal of Quality

                  Signaling and Equilibrium

                  Is Education Really Just a Signal?

                  Other Examples of Signaling

Dressing for success.  Licensing.  Celebrity endorsements of charities.  Deductibles in insurance.  Warranties.  Signals in nature.

17.    Search

                  Benefits and Costs of Search

                           Costs.  Benefits.

                  Optimal Search

Important features of the optimal search rule.  Box:  Do people use the optimal search strategy?

                  Determinants of the Amount of Search

                  Job Search

Searching for a first job.  Searching for a job when already employed.  Searching for a job while collecting unemployment benefits.

18.    Bargaining

                  The Goal of Bargaining

                  Sequential Bargaining

The simplest possible bargaining game.  A two-round bargaining game.  A three-round bargaining game.

                  Impatience, Uncertainty, and Risk Aversion

                           Impatience.  Uncertainty.  Risk Aversion.

                  The Nash Approach to Bargaining

                           What can we learn from the Nash bargaining solution?

                  General Lessons

19.    Training

                  Training in Professional Sports

                  Training and Human Capital

                  Bargaining and the Value of Training

                           Bargaining.  Conditions for training to occur.

                  Making Training Worthwhile for the Firm

                           Reducing the portability of skills.

                  Training and the Incentives to Remain with a Firm

20.    Benefits

                  The Issue of Child Care

                  Preferences over Benefits and Pay

The most-preferred package vs. the one offered by the firm.

                  Cost Advantages for the Firm

The sources of cost advantages.  Box:  Pharmacies at Caesars casinos.

                  The Problems Faced by Small Firms

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